Can public safety coexist with privacy?
Can public-safety technology improve security without enabling abuse?
What’s at stake
A system that helps locate a suspect can also help an authorized user track someone for personal reasons. Faster response and greater visibility create real value only alongside accountable use. The recurring question is how to make boundaries work in practice when the technology is powerful and the people using it can be mistaken or abusive.
The ideas that connect
Local control does not eliminate individual risk
The case for locally adopted cameras and drones is that communities can choose tools that meet their safety needs. The broader warning about surveillance asks what protects a person once that power exists. Those are complementary questions: approval by a city does not determine every permissible search, and a useful public purpose does not guarantee that every user acts for it.
Supporting passages
2026-05-22
It's cameras that use AI, monitor people who are committing crimes. There's a privacy issue around it. It is bottom-up. You just do it by town. It's not top-down, and states can regulate it. Same thing would probably happen with self-driving, and states will probably have some say in how AI is deployed, even if maybe some centralized governments don't want to do that. I really think this only comes down to-
The block safety thing, I think it's so good, Jason. Crime is now a choice.
Yeah.
I think the Cambridge city council voted to turn off gunshot detectors two days ago.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
2025-12-13
And it seems to me it would be important, and I never hear it raised, to put in some guardrails that protect the average powerless person against surveillance or having his rights taken away in a factor famously social credit score. It's just too easy to extract compliance from people with technology this powerful. And of course, the very obvious next 10 years looks like this. There's a lot of disruption because of the elimination of jobs, particularly low-end jobs, but not only low-end jobs, like lawyers and stuff, the true revolutionaries in any society. And then the technology itself is used to keep the population under control through repression. Like, I don't think that's a crazy scenario at all. You're a hundred percent right.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
An audit log must lead to meaningful review
Karp points to immutable logs as a safeguard. Flock’s account adds an operational problem: large agencies cannot manually inspect every search. Its proposed pattern detection looks for behavior such as repeatedly tracking one vehicle privately. This moves the question from whether a record exists to whether someone can notice misuse, investigate it and act on what the record shows.
Supporting passages
2025-09-09
Yeah. So first of all, I just want to, like, Palantir, like, there's a technical version, which I'm going to give you. But we had a democratic administration come to us and basically ask us to do a Muslim database. Now, you would think, given the way I'm kind of besmirched as like some kind of, I don't know, it's like a Jewish conspiracy, that would be the first thing, according to them, I would do. We've never done anything like this. I've never done anything like this. To actually understand the answer, and I love these questions about the skeptics, because like, I actually love skeptics. Like, I tend to divide the world into, you have Palantir Derangement System Syndrome, which I don't spend a lot of time on, and I think they're anti-builder. You have Palantir skeptics, and you have people who don't like Palantir. If you're a Palantir skeptic or you don't like us, I want to engage. And any technology that works can be abused. We are the single worst technology to use to abuse civil liberties, which is, by the way, the reason why we could never get the NSA or the FBI to actually buy our product. And until recently, like, SIGINT institutions would never buy our product. Yeah, you laugh because it's like obvious. If you want to do data analytics in a way that eviscerates our civil liberties, you don't want ACLs, you don't want branching, you don't want pipelining. You don't want logs. You don't want serialization and deserialization in your product. If you have serialization and deserialization in your product that's intelligible, you are basically creating a product that's going to be really, really hard to abuse. And the logs are immutable in Palantir.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
2026-08-18
So they're going to spot check 10 or 20 searches, which is the best they can do, and then move on. And so we built, four months ago, we built this new tool called Audit Assistance. Because we solved a million crimes last year. So we have a pretty good sense for what normal usage looks like. And then we had about just under a dozen abuses over the last eight years that we had detected. And said, we also kind of know what abuse looks like.
Tell us what does abuse look like.
So here's a good example. This is the easiest one. Let's say you're an officer, and you'll say you're trying to stalk me. You would look for me. You'd say, I'm looking for Garrett's car. It's ABC 1234 And you'd search for it and kind of figure out where it is. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. That's very abnormal. If you were truly trying to find me because I committed a crime, you would have put my tag on the hot list so that anyone else in the police department would have been also notified, because you might be asleep, you might be off shift, because I'm a criminal.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
Retention is a real tradeoff, not a neutral default
Keeping data longer can help investigate a crime discovered late. It also leaves a larger history available for future searches or misuse. Flock’s argument for longer retention in some serious cases sits alongside its account of abusive searches. The right question is therefore not just how much history is useful, but who can access it, for what purpose and under what review.
Supporting passages
2026-08-18
I mean, I'm going to give you an aggregate data point across the whole country. We think 90 percent of crimes will get solved within seven days of data retention. Beautiful. It is, Jason, but I would tell you, I've probably talked to two or three hundred police chiefs this week, and they remind me, and I tell them, you should tell your city council this, too. The 10 percent we're talking about, or the 10 percent you read about in the news, though, right? It's the homicide that there was never a 911 call because someone was killed, and it takes five days to discover the body because of a welfare check, and then it's a complicated case, or it's, look, and I'm sorry to go to this topic.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
2026-08-18
So they're going to spot check 10 or 20 searches, which is the best they can do, and then move on. And so we built, four months ago, we built this new tool called Audit Assistance. Because we solved a million crimes last year. So we have a pretty good sense for what normal usage looks like. And then we had about just under a dozen abuses over the last eight years that we had detected. And said, we also kind of know what abuse looks like.
Tell us what does abuse look like.
So here's a good example. This is the easiest one. Let's say you're an officer, and you'll say you're trying to stalk me. You would look for me. You'd say, I'm looking for Garrett's car. It's ABC 1234 And you'd search for it and kind of figure out where it is. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. That's very abnormal. If you were truly trying to find me because I committed a crime, you would have put my tag on the hot list so that anyone else in the police department would have been also notified, because you might be asleep, you might be off shift, because I'm a criminal.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
Safety claims and safeguards need observable outcomes
A vendor can describe useful investigations and a sophisticated audit system without proving that every deployment is well governed. The contrast between local enthusiasm and the warning about concentrated surveillance power makes oversight an ongoing task. Communities need to know whether the tool improves response, how often access is misused and whether the promised limits are enforced.
Supporting passages
2026-05-22
It's cameras that use AI, monitor people who are committing crimes. There's a privacy issue around it. It is bottom-up. You just do it by town. It's not top-down, and states can regulate it. Same thing would probably happen with self-driving, and states will probably have some say in how AI is deployed, even if maybe some centralized governments don't want to do that. I really think this only comes down to-
The block safety thing, I think it's so good, Jason. Crime is now a choice.
Yeah.
I think the Cambridge city council voted to turn off gunshot detectors two days ago.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
2026-08-18
So they're going to spot check 10 or 20 searches, which is the best they can do, and then move on. And so we built, four months ago, we built this new tool called Audit Assistance. Because we solved a million crimes last year. So we have a pretty good sense for what normal usage looks like. And then we had about just under a dozen abuses over the last eight years that we had detected. And said, we also kind of know what abuse looks like.
Tell us what does abuse look like.
So here's a good example. This is the easiest one. Let's say you're an officer, and you'll say you're trying to stalk me. You would look for me. You'd say, I'm looking for Garrett's car. It's ABC 1234 And you'd search for it and kind of figure out where it is. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. And then the next day, you'd search for me again. That's very abnormal. If you were truly trying to find me because I committed a crime, you would have put my tag on the hot list so that anyone else in the police department would have been also notified, because you might be asleep, you might be off shift, because I'm a criminal.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
2025-12-13
And it seems to me it would be important, and I never hear it raised, to put in some guardrails that protect the average powerless person against surveillance or having his rights taken away in a factor famously social credit score. It's just too easy to extract compliance from people with technology this powerful. And of course, the very obvious next 10 years looks like this. There's a lot of disruption because of the elimination of jobs, particularly low-end jobs, but not only low-end jobs, like lawyers and stuff, the true revolutionaries in any society. And then the technology itself is used to keep the population under control through repression. Like, I don't think that's a crazy scenario at all. You're a hundred percent right.
Open the source and seek to the timestamp above.
What remains unresolved
Can communities obtain the safety benefit with less collection, shorter retention and enforceable access limits? Evaluate both operational results and the ability to detect and remedy misuse.
A selected guide · September 2025–September 4, 2026 · Sources and method